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Impeaching the Professional Expert Witness
by a Showing. of Financial Interest
Michael H. Graham*
Gentlemen of the jury, there are three
kinds of liars, -the common liar, the d-d
liar, and the scientific expert.'
The professional'expert witness advocating the position of one side or the
other has become a fact of life in the litigation process. Practicing lawyers
can quickly and easily locate an expert witness to advocate nearly anything
they desire. In each part of the country, if you need an expert medical
witness to state that plaintiff suffered a whiplash injury, call expert X; if you
need a medical expert to dispute that fact, call expert Y. The use of the ex-
pert witness has become so prevalent that certain expert witnesses now derive
a significant portion of their total income from litigated matters. This article
deals with the extent to which it is now permissible to establish that a "profes-
sional expert" called to testify in a particular matter is biased because of
financial interest.2 Effective cross-examination of a professional expert witness
*B.S.E. 1964, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1967, Columbia University. Professor of
Law, University of Illinois.
'Foster, Expert Testimony-Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies, 11 HARv. L.
REv. 169 (1897). Attributed to an unidentified trial lawyer who, having encountered unsuc-
cessfully his adversary's expert witness, began his closing arguments with the quotation.
3A J. WIGMORE. EvIDENCE § 945 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1970) differentiates bias from interest
as follows:
Three different kinds of emotion constituting untrustworthy partiality may be broadly
distinguished-bias, interest, and corrupution:
Bias, in common acceptance, covers all varieties of hostility or prejudice against
the opponent personally or of favor to the proponent personally.
Interest signifies the specific inclination which is apt to be produced by the rela-
tion between the witness and the cause at issue in the litigation.
Corruption is here to be understood as the conscious false intent which is inferri-
ble from giving or taking a bribe or from expressions of a general unscrupulousness for
the case in hand.
The kinds of evidence available are two:
(a) the circumstances of the witness' situation, making it "a priori" probable that
he has some partiality of emotion for one party's cause;
(b) the conduct of the witness himself, indicating the presence of such partiality,
the inference here being from the expression of the feeling to the feeling itself.
Because of the close relationship of the terms bias and interest as applied to remuneration
of expert witnesses, they are used interchangeably throughout this article.
While the thrust of this article deals with the exploration upon cross-examination of the ex-
pert witness for bias caused by financial interest, the doctrine of excluding facts offered by ex-
trinsic evidence is not applicable to bias impeachment -extrinsic evidence may, where ap-
propriate, be admitted. Id. §948. It is anticipated however that extrinsic evidence will rarely be
required; the expert witness at trial will almost certainly confirm what was disclosed upon
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requires a broad construction of counsel's right to inquire into the financial
interest of the expert witness.
THE "VENALITY" OF THE EXPERT WITNESS
The problem of combating the unscrupulous expert witness deserves the
serious concern of all participants in the litigation process. The Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states the
issue as follows:
"The practice of shopping for experts, the venality of some ex-
perts, and the reluctance of many experts to involve themselves in
litigation, have been matters of deep concern." s
The "venality" of some experts-such a nasty word. Webster's Third
Unabridged Dictionary defines venal as "capable of being bought or obtained
for money or other valuable consideration; made matter of trade or barter;
salable; user; open to corrupt influence and esp. bribery; mercenary .. " In
other words, a paid whore. It is no wonder that expert witness venality is to-
day a matter of deep concern.
Unfortunately, neither the image possessed by experts nor the concern
generated by expert venality is a recent phenomenon. As early as 1858, none
other than the United States Supreme Court in Winans v. New York & Erie
Railroad4 felt compelled to speak to the question: "Experience has shown that
opposite opinions of persons professing to be experts may be obtained to any
amount." Some years later, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that all too
discovery. See notes 24 and 77 infra. The likelihood of the witness testifying inaccurately with
respect to such facts upon discovery is extremely small. The potential damage to the career of the
expert witness from being caught in a falsification of verifiable facts far outweighs the potential
for impeachment of credibility resulting from truthful disclosure.
3Advisory Committee's Note to FED R. EvID. 706 (emphasis added). Rule 706, entitled
"Court Appointed Experts," provides the court the right on its own motion to appoint an "impar-
tial" expert witness. The rule goes on to provide for a method of dealing with compensation to
the expert and disclosure of the fact of appointment of the court's expert to the jury. The ap-
pointment of the so-called "impartial" expert witness has long been advocated as the solution to
the problem of biased expert witnesses. See, e.g., the citations contained in Advisory Committee's
Note. However, in practice significant practical problems are created when the procedure is
employed. See Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony-Revnted, 34 TEMp. L.Q. 416 (1961). As a
result, the actual appointment of a court expert witness is a relatively infrequent occurrence.
'62 U.S. (21 How.) 88, 101 (1858). Accord, Schiagenhauf v. Holden, 379 U.S. 104 (1964)
(Douglass, J., dissenting).
And-a doctor for a fee can easily discover something wrong with any patient-a condi-
tion that in prejudiced medical eyes might have caused the accident. Once defendants
are turned over to medical or psychiatric clinics for an analysis of their physical well-
being and the condition of their psyche, the effective trial will be held there and not
before the jury .... The defendant is at the doctor's (or psychiatrist's) mercy; and his
report may either overawe or confuse the jury and prevent a fair trial.
Id. at 125.
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often the ease with which an expert may be found to support the theory of
either party is due to the fact his opinion is simply the natural and expected
result of his employment.5 Early commentators also spoke out. In an excellent
article in the Harvard Law Review, Judge Foster concluded that as of 1897
"bias or inclination in favor of a party by whom the witness is employed, is
probably the most frequent complaint of all against the expert witness; and
the inclination or partiality is often characterized by terms indicating
dishonesty and corruption."6 Professor Hines added the following observation:
It is often surprising to see with what facility and to what an extent
[experts'] views can be made to correspond with the wishes or in-
terests of the parties who call them ... [T]heir judgment becomes so
warped by regarding the subject in one point of view that even when
conscientiously disposed, they are incapable of expressing a candid
opinion. .... They are selected on account of their ability to express
a favorable opinion, which, there is great reason to believe is in many
instances the result alone of employment and the bias growing out of
it.7
Throughout the years, similar sentiments have continued to be echoed by,
both courts and commentators. The testimony of experts has been described
as "suspect," "of the lowest order," and "the most unsatisfactory part of
judicial administration."10 The intensity of such criticism seems to have grown
as changes in the litigation process have rendered the partisan nature of ex-
perts an even more serious problem." Of course, the use and importance of
the expert witness has also increased with the great expansion of litigation in
the products liability and medical malpractice areas. A dramatic illustration
of the dimensions of the problem of the unscrupulous expert in the medical
malpractice area is the recent disclosure of alteration, fabrication, and loss of
'Opp v. Pryor, 294 Il. 538, 545-46, 128 N.E. 580, 583 (1920).
Foster, supra note 1, at 171. This article contains many references to other discussions of
the problems occasioned by expert witnesses in the late 1800's.
'Statement by Professor Hines at 135 J. FRANKLIN INST. 309, quoted in Foster, supra note
1, at 170.
'State Highway Comm'n v. Superbilt Mfg. Co., 204 Ore. 393, 406, 281 P.2d 707, 713
(1955).
9Buttman v. Christy, 197 Iowa 661, 669, 198 N.W. 314, 317 (1924).
10 Opp v. Pryor, 294 11. 538, 545-46; 128 N.E. 580, 583 (1920).
"See generally Long, Discovery and Experts Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39
WASH. L. REv. 665, 674 (1964). Long attributes the increased risk of false testimony from expert
witnesses in part to the fact that they testify to opinions, not facts, and are therefore immune
frpm prosecution for perjury. See also Darling v. Charleston Hosp., 33 I1. 2d 326, 335, 211
N.E.2d 253, 259 (1965); Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules
of Ciil Procedure: Part Two, An Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 169, 189
n.44.
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medical records and charts while in the possession of defendants.12 While the
prevalence of such practices is disputed,13 its seriousness is highlighted by the
fact that medical experts are believed by many to be the most scrupulous
group of expert witnesses regularly testifying.' 4
Enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence and state 'codifications
modeled thereon have served to exacerbate the difficulties faced by counsel
opposing the testimony of the venal expert witness. Pursuant to rule 70215
almost everyone is qualified as an expert in one field or another. If the
witness has scientific, technical or specialized knowledge including knowledge
gained through experience which will be of assistance to the trier of fact, the
witness is an expert. Once qualified as an expert, pursuant to rule 70416 the
witness may testify to .such knowledge in the form of an opinion even if the
opinion embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. Not
only is nearly everyone an expert qualified to give an opinion, rule 70517 per-
12For example, a woman was admitted to a hospital for delivery of a child. The mother at
the moment of birth developed respiratory failure and cardiac arrest. The mother brought a
medical malpractice action claiming that her injury resulted because she had not been adequate-
ly monitored. Photocopies of the mother's hospital records showed close monitoring consistent
with the defendant's claim of no malpractice. Later, plaintiff obtained the baby's charts which
contained a carbon copy of the mother's delivery room record. Comparing these two charts
revealed significant alterations had been made in the mother's chart and that the injury had in
fact been caused by a failure to monitor her condition. Gage, Alteration, Falsification and
Fabrication of Records in Medical Malpractice Actions. 1976 CAL. TRIAL. L.J. 61.
"3Some attorneys opine that it is nearly routine and customary for doctors to review
and "correct" their records whenever they are advised that a malpractice suit is in the
offing; others feel that such incidents are frequent.
Our own experience suggests that the problem is sufficiently widespread and of
such a serious nature that it should not be overlooked in any malpractice case.
Id. at 66.
"See Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure: Part Two, An Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 169, 189 n. 44.
"1FED. R. EvID. 702:
TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an ex-
pert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise.
16FE. R. EvID. 704:
OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not ob-
jectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
"Fan. R. EvID. 705:
DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR DATA UNDERLYING
EXPERT OPINION
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons
therefore without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court re-
quires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying
facts or data on cross-examination.
Compare the rule with Opp v. Pryor, 294 Ill. 538, 545, 128 N.E. 580, 583 (1920): "The objec-
ions to that character of evidence can only be overcome or obviated by control by the court of
the witness and the examination and such supervision as will at least fairly present the facts upon
which an opinion is called for."
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mits the expert to give his opinion on the ultimate issue without first disclos-
ing the underlying facts or data on which his opinion is based. If this was not
enough, pursuant to rule 70 3 s the underlying facts or data forming the basis
of the opinion not only need not have been admitted into evidence, they need
not even be admissible into evidence if reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions upon the subject. Finally, counsel op-
posing the testimony of the expert witness may find in preparing to cross-
examine the expert as to his opinion upon an ultimate issue, unsupported by
disclosure on direct examination of facts or data, that full discovery as to
such underlying facts and data is unavailable.' 9
The Federal Rules of Evidence thus deal all the cards to the party prof-
fering the expert witness; the testimony of the expert can be introduced in
almost any manner the party chooses. 20 The Rules provide to the witness a
significant opportunity to persuade the trier of fact of the opinion he has
been paid to convey. In particular, the potential for increased effectiveness of
both the scrupulous and unscrupulous expert is fostered by (1) removal of the
hypothetical question requirement, 2' (2) the revision of the rules of evidence
to enable an expert to state his opinion without prior disclosure of his basis,22
and (3) the fact that the expert basis need not even be admissible> into
evidence if reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. 23 The Rules place
the ball in cross-examining counsel's court-the burden is on opposing
817m. R. EvID. 703:
BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert based an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hear-
ing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
19See generally Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Part One, An Analytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 895.
"See Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of
Fed. Crim. Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 355-56 (Supp.
1973).
Presentation may consist of anything from a full presentation (e.g., qualification, basis, opi-
nion, reasoning) to a bare bones presentation.
For example, one can envision the following dialogue immediately after the ex-
pert had been qualified as an orthopedic surgeon:
Q. Doctor, do you have an opinion based upon a reasonable degree of medical
certainty as to the extent [of] permanent disability suffered by the plaintiff as a result
of this automobile accident?
A. Yes.
Q. What is your opinion?
A. She is toally permanently disabled.
Q. Thank, you doctor, that is all.
Id. at 356. Note that rule 705 permits the proffering party to hold in reserve segments of the ex-
pert's testimony to be unleashed by the expert upon cross-examination by opposing counsel.
2See Advisory Committee's Note to FF.. R. EVID. 705.
2"See note 17 supra.
23See note 18 supra.
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counsel to explore the underlying facts, data, and assumptions, and otherwise
discredit the testimony of the incorrect and/or dishonest expert witness dur-
ing the cross-examination.2 4
In combating testimony of the expert witness, opposing counsel must rely
upon his skill in probing at weaknesses in the basis and reasoning of the
witness whether or not disclosed upon direct, without letting the witness rein-
force his direct testimony in the process. He must do this with an expert
witness more familiar with the subject matter.26 Of course, counsel also has
available the use of learned treatises26 to assist him in fencing with the
witness. Unfortunately fencing with the witness is the impression the cross-
examination of an expert witness often leaves with the jury, an impression
trial counsel would prefer to avoid. The difficulty in conducting a successful
destructive cross-examination is compounded by the growing number of ex-
perts whose livelihood is dependent in large part upon the litigation process. 27
Such experts with their vast amount of litigation experience become excep-
tionally proficient in the art of expert witness advocacy.2 8
24See note 17 supra. The Advisory Committee's Note to rule 705 provides:
If the objection is made that leaving it to the cross-examiner to bring out the sup-
porting data is essentially unfair, the answer is that he is under no compulsion to bring
out any facts or data except those unfavorable to the opinion. The answer assumes
that the cross-examiner has the advance knowledge which is essential for effective
cross-examination. This advance knowledge has been afforded, though imperfectly, by
the traditional foundation requirement. Rule 26(b)(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
as revised, provides for substantial discovery in this area, obviating in large measure
the obstacles which have been raised in some instances to discovery of findings,
underlying data, and even the identity of the experts. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use
of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REv. 455 (1962).
For a discussion of the role and availability of discovery of expert witnesses under rule 26(b)(4),
see generally Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Part Two, An Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 169. For authority
permitting discovery solely for purposes of impeachment, see C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER. FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2015 (1970); 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PPRACTIcE § 26.56 (2d ed.
1976). Contra, Russell v. Young, 452 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1970).
t 5This is most certainly true at the outset of litigation. However, with thorough painstaking
preparation trial counsel can acquire a mastery of the subject even surpassing that of the expert
witness.
25See, e.g., FED. R. Evin. 803(18).
2ln some instances the expert witness has more trial experience than counsel conducting
the cross-examination.
t8The performances of such professional witnesses are brilliantly described in Kemeny v.
Skorch, 22 Ill. App. 2d 160, 159 N.E.2d 489 (1959).
An expert medical witness is an important part of the technique of personal in-
jury litigation. He generally is a persuasive, fluent, impressive witness, able to make
the jury understand that what he is telling them is the product of years of educational
preparation and medical experience, with particular reference to and emphasis on the
specialty involved. He will name his colleges and universities, his degrees, the medical
societies to which he belongs, the national specialty groups to which he has been ad-
mitted, the hospitals in which he has interned or externed, and the hospital staffs on
which he has held positions. Having thus made his introduction, he will state his fin-
dings upon examination of the plaintiff and, by means of a long hypothetical question
PROFESSIONAL EXPERT WITNESS
In summary, effective cross-examination of the professional expert is
often extremely difficult under the best of circumstances. The subject matter
is within the expertise of the witness, not the attorney. The experienced ex-
pert is at ease with the material and capable of making fine line distinctions
between the current situation and those raised in the questions of examining
counsel. For these reasons among others it has been questioned whether even
a well executed cross-examination of the unscrupulous expert, coupled with
contradiction by a reputable expert, will be appreciated by the jury.
A glib and unscrupulous expert witness with no qualification in his
professed field other than a willingness to sell any opinion to anyone
who wants it will frequently out sell the conscientious, well-trained
and careful expert who gives no opinion that he cannot back up. The
concept that the [jury] can detect a fraud is absurd. 29
ESTABLISHING FINANCIAL INTEREST
Faced with the difficult task of conducting a destructive cross-
examination of a professional expert witness through attack upon the expert's
qualifications, basis, assumptions or reasoning, the availability of impeach-
ment of the expert witness through a showing of bias due to financial interest
takes on additional importance. With respect to probing upon cross-
examination the financial interest of the adversary's expert witness, it is
universally recognized that pecuniary interest is a proper subject of cross-
examination because it establishes bias in favor of the party by whom a
witness is being remunerated. The latitude permitted counsel on cross-
examination in exploring the expert witness's financial interest is stated to be
within the discretion of the trial court; only where this is a clear abuse of
discretion will the trial court's determination be overturned.30 Given the
devised for that purpose, will relate the cause of the pathological condition to the acci-
dent and give his prognosis.
The fluency of the contemporary doctor is a matter of amazement and perhaps
envy to the professional supposed to have a monopoly on the use of language. It was
not long ago that the spate of literature-fictional, biographical, scientific and
historical-that issued from the pens of wielders of the scalpel and distributors of cap-
sules startled literary critics. One, with a touch of bitterness, ventured to say that to
become a successful writer it was necessary to have a medical degree. Even so, little
did the nonitigating public know the true rhetorical masterpieces that came from the
lips of medical experts on the witness stand and how they, as much as the lawyers,
shattered the aerial limits of verdicts in personal injury cases and made hundreds of
thousands grow where only thousands grew before.
Id. at 170-71, 159 N.E.2d at 493-94.
"Statement from an attorney quoted in Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Part Two, An Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U.
ILL. L.F. 169, 189 n.44.
"
0See generally United States v. Dwyer, 539 F.2d 924, 927 (2nd Cir. 1976); United States v.
Wixom, 529 F.2d 217, 220 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Fairchild, 526 F.2d 185, 187 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 425 U.S. 942 (1976); H.I. Holding Co. v. Dade County, 129 So. 2d 693,
1977-1978]
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foregoing discussion of the position of expert witnesses in the litigation pro-
cess,31 one would instinctively feel that courts universally accord counsel wide
berth in cross-examining an expert witness3 2 as to bias based upon financial
interest. However, such appears not to be the case. As strange as it may
seem, reported decisions indicate that the litigation process has yet to permit
counsel to bring to bear upon the expert witness the full force of such im-
peaching cross-examination.
A. Inquiry Generally Permitted
Turning first to those areas in which courts are in general agreement that
inquiry is proper, it may be established that an expert is being paid for his
testimony in the instant trial"s which may include the services he performed
which enable him to testify.3 4 Moreover, inquiry is properly addressed to the
amount of compensation an expert is receiving for testifying or for his time,35
694-95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Weaver v. Georgia Power Co., 134 Ga. App. 696, 215 S.E.2d
503, 504 (1975); 3A J. WIGMORE. EVIDENCE § 944 U. Chadbourn rev. 1970); McCORMICK'S HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF EvIDENCE §§ 24, 29 (E. Cleary's 2d ed. 1972). The first three decisions inter-
pret FED. R. EvID. 403 which provides:
EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF
PREJUDICE, CONFUSIONS, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.
"1See notes 3-29 supra & text accompanying.
"2With respect to the wide latitude generally permitted on cross-examining an expert
witness, see Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975
(1958); Gwathmey v. United States, 215 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1954).
33See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Holt, 236 Ill. 485, 86 N.E. 256 (1908); Chicago City Ry. v. Han-
dy, 208 Ill. 81, 69 N.E. 917 (1904). See also cases discussed in note 36 infra.
"McNenar v. New York, Chi. & St. L. R.R., 20 F.R.D. 598 (W.D. Pa. 1957); Com-
monwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353 (1949). In practice many expert witnesses
refuse to admit that they are being paid "for their testimony"; they state that they are being paid
solely for their time. See Weaver v. Georgia Power Co., 134 Ga. App. 696, 215 S.E.2d 503
(1975); State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 51 S.E.2d 348 (1949).
"See, e.g, State v. Howington, 268 Ala. 574, 109 So.2d 676 (1959) (in condemnation pro-
ceeding, court did not abuse discretion in permitting cross-examination of state's expert witnesses
as to the amount paid to them per day for testifying); Niven v. State, 190 Ark. 514, 80 S.W.2d
644 (1935) (not error to require medical expert in murder case to testify to fee expected for his
testimony as such); Camp v. State, 31 Ga. App. 737, 122 S.E. 249 (1924) (trial court should have
permitted defendant accused of embezzling to show the expert accountant was being paid twenty
dollars per day by prosecution for time consumed as a witness); Shaughnessy v. Holt, 236 Ill.
485, 86 N.E. 256 (1908) (allowed questions to physician as to amount he received for testifying as
an expert); Butman v. Christy, 197 Iowa 661, 198 N.W. 314 (1924) (handwriting expert in will
contest should have been allowed to answer what his charges were); Alford v. Vincent, 52 Mich.
555, 19 N.W. 182 (1884) (plaintiff properly permitted to show physician put on the stand by
defendant as an expert witness being paid twenty-five dollars for his attendance); Wakeley v.
State, 118 Neb. 346, 225 N.W. 42 (1929) (in forgery case, the trial court erred in its refusal to
allow cross-examination of state's handwriting expert as to his fees); Commonwealth v. Simmons,
361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 862 (1949) (in murder trial, proper to allow
cross-examination of psychiatrist called by defendant as to how much he received as a fee for the
examination and for his appearance in court); Grutski v. Kline, 352 Pa. 401, 43 A.2d 142 (1945)
[Vol. 53:35
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and that this amount exceeds the statutory witness fee.36 It matters not that
the amount of an expert's fee is stipulated in advance or determinable in the
future;3 7 compensation has a direct and vital bearing upon his credibility and
in either event may be established. Accordingly even if an expert has not yet
been paid, he may be cross-examined as to the amount he expects to
receive,38 the method he'll use to determine the amount he will charge 9 and
whether the amount is contingent upon the outcome of the litigation.40
(plaintiffs were entitled to show what compensation defendant's doctors were receiving);
Redevelopment Auth. v. Asta, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 576, 329 A.2d 300 (1974) (the amount of
compensation paid to -expert witness may have a definite effect upon their credibility). Contra,
Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358 (1941); Weaver v. Georgia Power Co., 134 Ga.
App. 696, 215 S.E.2d 503 (1975); Current v. Columbia Gas, 383 S.W.2d 139 (1964) (while per-
mitting inquiry into details of compensation rests largely within the discretion of the trial court,
in the absence of unusual circumstances, the better rule is to limit the showing to the fact that
payment is being made).
"
6Chicago City Ry. v. Handy, 208 Ill. 81, 69 N.E. 917 (1904) (it is competent to show that
a witness has charged or expects to receive greater compensation than the fee allowed by statute);
Fetty v. State, 118 Neb. 169, 223 N.W. 955 (1929) (an expert witness may be interrogated as to
the amount of fees paid or promised to be paid him in excess of the legal fees provided by statute
for ordinary witnesses).
37Grutski v. Kline, 352 Pa. 401, 43 A.2d 142 (1945); Reed v. Philadelphia Transp. Co.,
171 Pa. Super. 60, 69, 90 A.2d 371 (1952).
"Id. See also Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Ampsey, 232 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Ct. App. 1950)
(proper to establish on cross-examination that insurance company hiring doctor as expert witness
owed him several thousand dollars).
"Redevelopment Auth. v. Asta, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 576, 329 A.2d 300 (1974); Grutski v.
Kline, 352 Pa. 401, 43 A.2d 142 (1945).
'"In McNenar v. New York, Chi. and St. L. R.R., 20 F.R.D. 598 (W.D. Pa. 1957), the
court states:
Nor is it to be disputed that the court in its discretion may allow counsel to cross-
examine an expert witness as to the amount he has received, is to receive, or expects to
receive for treatment, examination or testifying, for such information has a possible
bearing upon the witness's impartiality, credibility and interest in the result.
Id. at 600. See West Skokie Drainage Dist. v. Dawson, 243 Ill. 175, 90 N.E. 377 (1909) (in ac-
tion brought by district to condemn right of way for ditch, attorney should have been permitted
on cross-examination to ask engineer about his interest in the result of the suit and if he had not
been promised "considerable money" if the proceedings went through); Volpe v. Petruzzi, 122
N.J.L. 57, 3 A.2d 893 (1939) (trial court should have permitted following question profferred to
doctor on cross-examination: "Does the outcome of this case determine whether or not you get
paid?"); Redevelopment Auth. v. Asta, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 576, 329 A.2d 300 (1974) (if the ex-
pert witness's fee is in any way related to the size of the verdict or the number of proprieties in-
volved, then the jury is entitled to consider that relationship in weighing the expert's testimony);.
St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Clifford, 148 S.W. 1163 (Tex. Ct. App. 1912) (Defendant's counsel at-
tempted to develop proof that doctor had received percentage of recovery in previous case and
that he had made some arrangement in the present case. On appeal, court stated the question of
whether such inquiry should be permitted was clearly within the rule of Horton and therefore left
to the discretion of trial court); Horton v. Houston & T.C. Ry., 46 Tex. Civ. App. 639, 103
S.W. 467 (1907) (To show interest of physician, counsel asked whether he had testified for plain-
tiffs in many cases brought by attorneys for plaintiff in present case. Physician admitted testifying
in several, but was unable to remember how many. Counsel then named cases, his questions also
tending to elicit the fact physician's fees in named cases were dependent upon recovery of
damages. On appeal, such questioning was held to be proper).
The question of whether the Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by the American
Bar Association on August 12, 1969, may constitutionally prohibit contingent fees in Disciplinary
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Moreover, a refusal to permit inquiry with respect to the details of the ar-
rangement for compensation with respect to the expert's testimony in the in-
stant trial may constitute clear abuse of discretion and reversible error. 4'
Examining counsel may also inquire of an expert as to how he originally
became involved in the case. 42 While it is generally deemed irrelevant and
unduly prejudicial to reveal that the defendant is insured or that the plain-
tiffs claim has been subrograted by an insurance company, since a witness's
interest, bias, or prejudice is never irrelevant, the opposing party may not be
deprived of showing interest, bias, or prejudice arising by virtue of the ex-
pert's relationship with a party even if that party is an insurance company. 43
In addition to showing an expert's financial interest in the instant case
and how the expert became employed, a continuing relationship may be
shown if the relationship gives rise to an inference of bias in favor of the par-
ty calling the expert. Thus, it is proper to show that the expert is an
Rule 7-109 C is a matter of current dispute. See Person v. Association of Bar of New York, 554
F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'g 414 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (summary declaration of un-
constitutionality). In the course of its opinion, the Second Circuit stated:
Disciplinary Rule 7-109 C was promulgated to insure that judicial proceedings in New
York were free of false testimony which might result if expert witnesses were paid on a
contingent fee basis. Expert testimony, by its very nature, concerns areas of knowledge
with which the ordinary juror and the court are unfamiliar, and peijured expert
testimony is particularly difficult for a juror to detect. New York has adopted DR
7-109 C to lessen the likelihood of false expert testimony. The rule is not invalid
because it cannot prevent all perjured expert testimony ...
Person has advanced arguments why it might be desirable to alter the present rule
in order to facilitate litigation by less affluent litigants. He points out that cross-
examination would reveal whatever financial stake a witness has in the outcome of
litigation. He notes that experts often have ongoing business relationships with the par-
ties who retain them and therefore, in an indirect sense, frequently have a stake in the
outcome of litigation although their fee is not contingent and thus not covered by DR
7-109 C. Other experts, although retained on a "fixed fee" basis, often do not expect.
to receive payment unless the party for whom they testify is successful. These are fac-
tors which may indicate the desirability of legislative change, but they do not con-
stitute sufficient grounds for invalidating the current canon or rule.
554 F.2d at 538-39.
"Butman v. Christy, 197 Iowa 661, 198 N.W. 314 (1924) (in will contest, where hand-
writing expert was only testimony which refuted testimony of three eyewitnesses who claimed to
have seen decedent sign the will, it was reversible error where cross-examination was not permit-
ted as to the terms of his employment); Duffy v. Griffith, 134 Pa. Super. Ct. 447, 4 A.2d 170
(1939) (reversible error where trial judge refused to permit inquiry within reasonable limits as to
the amount of the witness's compensation for testifying).
"2See note 43 infra.
4'Thus, in Allen B. Wrisley Co. v. Burke, 203 Ill. 250, 67 N.E. 818 (1903), a personal in-
jury action, the court permitted a showing on cross-examination that the defendant's doctor has
been employed to make an examination of the plaintiff for purposes of becoming a witness
although in developing such proof it was incidentally shown that the doctor was paid by an in-
surance company. Similarly, in Schuler v. St. Louis Gas Co., 322 Mo. 765, 775, 18 S.W.2d 42,
46 (1929), counsel was permitted to inquire of a consulting engineer, "At whose request did you
go down there to make this inspection?" despite the fact the answer happened to be defendant's
insurer. See Majestic v. Louisville & N. R.R., 147 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1945); Houfbrug v. Kansas
City Stockyards Co., 283 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1955); Price v. Yellow Cab Co., 443 Pa. 56, 278 A.2d
161 (1971); and cases cited notes 40 and 41 supra.
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employee of the calling party44 or an employee of the true party in interest. 45
In addition, counsel upon cross-examination is entitled to bring to the atten-
tion of the trier of fact that the expert witness has testified previously on
behalf of the calling party;4" prior testimony gives rise to both an inference of
friendliness to the party and an inference of bias in favor of the party based
upon an expectation of future employment. Similarly, inquiry is proper with
respect to the number of times an expert witness has testified for the attorney
of a particular party.
47
B. Inquiry Only Sometimes Permitted
If counsel desires to proceed further with cross-examination directed at
exposing financial interest of the expert witness, his right to proceed is at best
44E.g., Majestic v. Louisville & N. R. R., 147 F.2d 621, (6th Cir. 1945).
Under this rule the fact that a witness is employed by a party to the suit is regarded as
a relevant circumstance to be considered by the jury as showing bias or interest and a
fortiori where the witness is an employee of a party who has an interest in the
recovery, his employement may be shown for the same reason.
Thurber Corp. v. Fairchild Motor Corp., 269 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1959). See generally McCoR-
MICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 40 (E. Cleary's 2d ed. 1972); 3 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 948-49, at 500-01, 966-69 (3d ed. 1940).
4'Genest v. Odell Mfg. Co., 75 N.H. 509, 77 A. 77 (1910). The court held it proper for
plaintiff to show that the doctor called by defendant was an employee of defendant's insurer.
46See Gwathmey v. United States, 215 F.2d 148, 159 (5th Cir. 1954) (appellants were per-
mitted to elicit from expert witness his admission that he had testified for government in prior
proceedings); Jones v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R., 202 Ala. 381, 80 So. 463 (1918) (in suit for
damages for pollution of stream, plaintiff should have been permitted to show witness had fre-
quently testified for the defendant in cases of similar character); St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v.
McMichael, 115 Ark. 101, 171 S.W. 115 (Ark. 1914) (plaintiff properly allowed to ask engineers
called as experts whether they had frequently been called by defendant); B.I. Sutton v. State
Highway Dept., 103 Ga. App. 29, 118 S.E.2d 285 (1961) (held reversible error where trial court
refused to permit cross-examination of witness as to whether he had testified as an expert in
other condemnation cases tried in the same court); State v. Horman, 188 Minn. 252, 247 N.W. 4
(1933) (it was proper to inquire whether state's witness had testified for the state on similar occa-
sions); Central Lumber Co. v. Porter, 139 Miss. 66, 103 So. 506 (1925) (court should have per-
mitted question as to number of times physician had testified for defendant); Zarisky v. Kansas
City Pub. Serv. Co., 239 Mo. App. 396, 186 S.W.2d 854 (1945) (plaintiff inquired of defendant's
expert medical witness as to the number of times he had previously testified for the Kansas City
Public Service Co. in personal injury litigation); Carlson v. Kansas City, 282 S.W. 1037 (Mo.
1926) (if witness served as physician for defendant or was called by defendant sufficient number
of times to give rise to inference of friendliness between witness and defendant, jury was entitled
to know it).
471f in fact [the expert wintess] has spent a good part or most of his time in the employ
of the government as an expert appraisal witness, and if in fact his testimony is of such
a nature that special counsel for the Government regularly uses him as a witness, it
seems to us the jury was entitled to know this for the reason stated. Since his testimony
consisted mainly of his expert opinion as to values, the jury had the right to consider
whether this regular employment has a tendency to create a bias in favor of the
Government.
Gwathmey v. United States, 215 F.2d 148, 159 (5th Cir. 1954). See, e.g., Henry v. Landreth, 494
S.W.2d 114 (Ark. 1973); Ager v. Baltimore Transit Co., 132 A.2d 469 (Md. App. 1957) (counsel
for defendant in personal injury case properly permitted to inquire of one of plaintiff's medical
experts as to the number of times he examined persons referred to him by plaintiff's attorneys);
Lammert v. Wells, 13 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1928).
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unclear. For example, courts have reached differing conclusions as to the pro-
priety of inquiry directed at the amount of compensation the witness has
received from the same party over a period of time. Some decisions have
refused to permit such inquiry fearing that it would open the door to a
lengthy explanation by the expert of the services rendered in justification of
the fees received."m However, Ilinois, courts have adopted the sounder ap-
proach and have allowed such inquiry as proper exploration of bias brought
about by financial interest. 49 In Kerfoot v. City of Chicago,0 a special assess-
ment had been levied for street repairs. In order to show the value of the
benefit which had accrued, the city of Chicago called several experts all of
whom acknowledged that they had been similarly employed by the city and
paid for their services in the past and that they expected to be paid for their
services in the present suit. The Illinois Supreme Court held that questions in-
quiring as to how much each witness had received for his prior services as a
witness and specifically how much each witness had received in the last year
from the city of Chicago should have been permitted:
It would manifestly be important, in determining the credit to be
given to these witnesses and the value of their opinions, to know
whether they were receiving only fair and ordinary compensation for
their time, or whether the employment was of such a character, and
the compensation such, as to make it desirable that the employment
should continue, and that the city should be fully satisfied with the
opinions given.5 1
If inquiry upon cross-examination is expanded ever so slightly to a com-
parison between the income received from testifying for the same party and
from other sources, apparently even the Illinois Supreme Court draws the
line.62
"4See People v. Tomalty, 111 P. 513 (Cal. App. 1910) (the trial court did not allow ques-
tions as to the amount the expert called by the state, in a criminal case, had been paid for both
this case, and over the last year. This was upheld on the grounds that a showing that an expert
had been employed and paid by the state only would have opened the door for a long examina-
tion as to the kind and extent of services rendered); State v. Superbilt Mfg. Co., 204 Ore. 393,
281 P.2d 707 (1955) (question as to the amount received in unrelated cases improper, would re-
quire that expert to be allowed to show fees he charged were justified); Zamsky v. Public Parking
Auth., 378 Pa. 38, 105 A.2d 335 (1954) (earnings of an expert witness from other services per-
formed to the defendant is purely a collateral matter and the testimony is not admissible to affect
the expert's credibility).
4"See City of Chicago v. Van Schaack Bros. Chem. Works, Inc., 330 Il. 264, 161 N.E. 486
(1928); Kerfoot v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 229, 63 N.E. 101 (1902).
50195 Ill. 229, 63 N.E. 101 (1902).
5 Id. at 235, 63 N.E. at 103.
"
1In Gordon v. Chicago, 201 Ill. 623, 66 N.E. 823 (1903), an expert had testified with
respect to compensation to be received in the instant case and with respect to the amount of
compensation he had received in the previous year testifying for the city. Accord, City of Chicago
v. Van Schaack Bros. Chem. Works, Inc., 330 Ill. 264, 161 N.E. 486 (1928). The Illinois
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's sustaining of objections to further questions (1) compar-
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Unfortunately reported decisions also display disagreement as to whether
a party may demonstrate bias on the part of the expert by showing that the
expert frequently testifies for one particular category of party, e.g., personal
injury claimants suffering from similar injuries"3 or insurance companies
defending such claims, and never for the other side. While few reported deci-
sions have considered this question, the more recent decisions have tended to
uphold the use of such questions or at least hold that the trial court could in
its discretion permit such inquiry.5 ' The older decisions primarily arising in
Illinois disagree.55 Disappointingly many of the reported decisions in this area
simply state the court's conclusion as to whether or not the questioning is pro-
per without any indication of the court's reasoning. Turning to the older line
of authorities, in Chicago City Railway v. Smith,56 a trial court sustained an
objection to the following question addressed to a medical expert called by
the plaintiff: "Isn't it the principal part of your professional industry to be in
consultation with attorneys, to hunt up these claims, or, whether you hunt
them up or not, secure them, and in consultation with them have an arrange-
ment with them for contingent fees?" The bar to this line of questioning was
upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court stating that while an expert could be
cross-examined as to his motives, feelings, and prejudices, it was not error to
refuse to allow cross-examination to be extended to cases having no connec-
tion with the case being tried. The only authority cited in support was
Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad v. Schmitz, 57 wherein the Illinois
Supreme Court had upheld the preclusion of cross-examination of a doctor as
to professional opinions he had given in other personal injury suits against
one or more of the appellant railways. Schmitz also approved a bar to ques-
tions on the direct examination of other defense witnesses seeking to elicit
evidence that plaintiffs doctor was interested as a medical man in a large
number of personal injury suits against corporations. Relying solely on these
two decisions the Illinois Supreme Court in McMahon v. Chicago City
Railway5 held that the trial court had erred when it permitted a question as
to the number of times the doctor had testified as an expert for the street car
lines of Chicago as opposed to testimony for this defendent only. The court
held that the question should have been limited to the number of times he
ing the expert's annual income from testifying for the city with the amount he had made in his
regular real estate business and (2) inquiring of the amount in absolute dollar terms he had
made in the real estate business. The court found both rulings proper stating merely that the ex-
pert's income from his private business was irrelevant.
5 5There is rumored to be a doctor in Illinois who performs a certain type of surgery with
great frequency often on referral from other doctors not willing themselves to perform surgery
they believe to be unnecessary.
5 See notes 56-75 infra & text accompanying.
51See notes 56-63 infra & text accompanying.
5226 Ill. 178, 80 N.E. 716 (1907).
"1211 I1. 446, 71 N.E. 1050 (1904).
58239 Il. 334, 88 N.E. 223 (1909).
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testified for the appellant railway; clearly a distinction without merit. The Il-
linois Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue since. However, in Plambeck
v. Chicago Railways59 it held that a comparison of times testified exceeded
the proper scope of cross-examination. In Plambeck a police officer, a non-
expert, called by the railway company, was cross-examined to show he had
testified " 'in behalf of the street car company' about five or six times
previous to this trial and had never been called by an injured person to
testify. "6 0 The Illinois Supreme Court stated, "Under the previous holdings of
this court it was proper cross-examination to have the witness testify how
many times he had testified previously for [the railway company]. This was as
far as the [plaintiff] was entitled to go with this cross-examination. It was im-
proper cross-examination to elicit from the witness the fact he never testified
in court for a person injured. "6 1 While the clear intent of such inquiry was to
show that his sympathies were with the railway company, the court found
that the mere fact he had never testified for an injured party was not a pro-
per basis for drawing such an unfavorable conclusion. This decision was
relied upon by an Illinois Appellate court in Schoolfield v. Witkowski 2 in fin-
ding improper (without explanation) inquiry upon cross-examination of plain-
tiffs doctor concerning the number of times the doctor had testified in the
previous year and whether his testimony was not always for plaintiff, the
"person seeking to gain money." 63
The decisions prohibiting such inquiry are not limited to Illinois. For ex-
ample, in the Ninth Circuit decision of Southwest Metals Co. v. Gomez, 64 the
question, "Do -you make it a habit of appearing for plaintiffs in these per-
sonal injury cases?" was held to be properly sustained "on he ground that the
question was too indefinite and called for the conclusion of the witness, if for
no other reason. '66 In Mixon v. Willard,66 a federal district court opinion, it
was held not to be an abuse of discretion to sustain the objection to a ques-
tion addressed to a physician in a hearing before the Bureau of Employees'
Compensation as to whether he had ever arrived at a conclusion in any case
which was adverse to an insurance company. The court did state that "the
deputy commissioner might have allowed plaintiff to pursue this line of ques-
tioning further in an attempt to show possible bias," although such refusal
did not constitute a denial of due process.6 7
Courts which have permitted cross-examination inquiring into prior
testimony on behalf of a particular category of party have apparently ac-
:9294 Ill. 302, 128 N.E. 513 (1920).
6
Old. at 305, 128 N.E. at 514.
"1Id.
254 Ill. App. 2d 111, 203 N.E.2d 460 (1964).
'I1d. at 126, 203 N.E.2d at 467.
644 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1925). This case was criticized in 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 961,
at n.2 (3d ed. 1940).
654 F.2d at 218.
16120 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
GlId. at 234.
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cepted the contention that the prior testimony for one side or another is rele-
vant to a showing of bias. Unfortunately, such decisions similarly contain lit-
tle explanation. Texas appears to have adopted the sounder view of permit-
ting cross-examination of an expert to show that he regularly testifies on
behalf of a particular category of party. In Traders & General Insurance Co.
v. Robinson", the court permitted cross-examination of plaintiffs doctor as
to the numerous personal injury cases in which he had testified for plaintiffs,
including the listing of a dozen places where he had testified in similar cases.
In Martin v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,69 the trial court was found
to have erred when it excluded the following questions addressed to the
defendant's doctor on cross-examination: "You examine patients for insurance
companies quite often don't you doctor?" and "Do you testify for a lot of in-
surance companies, doctor?"70 However, such error was found not to be rever-
sible. And in Barrios v. Davis7 1, the court relying on Traders and Martin,
upheld the interrogation of a doctor as to the number of times he testified,
counties where tried, fees charged, amount collected by him in one year from
attorneys in cases referred to him, and his reputation as a doctor who
testified on behalf of the injured. The court in approving such questions
stated:
The law is well settled that on cross-examination a witness may be questioned
as to facts or acts tending to show bias, interest, or prejudice, and that ques-
tions relative to interest, bias or prejudice are never collateral or immaterial,
and further that in the use of cross-examination to show interest or bias or
prejudice the greatest latitude is allowed, the scope in any particular instance
being a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court.71
In United States v. Abrans,1s an attorney charged with fraudulent prac-
tices before the immigration board called as an expert witness another at-
torney who also specialized in immigration law. The Second Circuit held it
was within the permissible scope of cross-examination to show the attorney
had previously testified as a defense expert in two similar cases since it was
relevant on the issue of bias. The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that it is
not prejudicial error to allow plaintiff to ask engineers called as defendant's
experts whether or not they had frequently been called by the appellant
railway and other railways to testify as experts.74 The Missouri Supreme Court
68222 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Ct. App. 1949). It was held to be within the discretion of the trial
court to refuse a detailed cross-examination of the medical records for such cases.
89388 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965).
'
5Id. at 31.
"415 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967). Barrios was cited with approvil in Russell v.
Young, 452 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1970).
72415 S.W.2d at 716.
"3427 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1970).
7'4St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. McMichael, 115 Ark. 101, 171 S.W. 115 (1914).
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 53:35
thus held that the jury is entitled to know everything that might affect the
credibility of the witness, including his relationship with parties interested in
the result of the case. 75
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
How far may counsel proceed with cross-examination directed at
establishing bias based upon financial interest? If cross-examination is directed
at establishirig bias through financial interest, it will generally be permitted if it
is directed at establishing (1) financial interest in the case at hand by reason
of remuneration for services, (2) continued employment by a party or (3) the
fact of prior testimony for the same party or the same attorney. When it
comes to questions directed toward establishing (1) the amount of previous
compensation from the same party, (2) the relationship between the expert's
income from testifying on behalf of a party or a category of party and total
income of the expert, or (3) the mere fact of prior testimony most frequently
on behalf of other persons or entities similarly situated, the cases indicate
disagreement.
It is urged that the permissible scope of cross-examination of an expert
witness should include each and every one of the foregoing areas of inquiry.
Inquiry should be permitted, for example, into whether an expert frequently
testifies for one particular category of party and into the percentage of his
livelihood derived from acting as an expert witness for such party or category
of party. 76 Such information is clearly relevant to establishing bias on the part
of the expert witness in favor of the party proferring the witness. 77 Sufficient
71Schuler v. St. Louis Can Co., 322 Mo. 765, 18 S.W.2d 42 (1929). The court held proper
the following cross-examination of a doctor testifying for the defense as to the nature and extent
of plaintiff's injuires:
Q. Doctor, you are regular physician for practically every company in the City of St.
Louis, down here at 309 South Broadway?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you make your living, and have for a number of years, at the behest
of insurance companies, haven't you?
A. Yes, sir. (Objection, ruling and exception.)
Q. You may answer, Doctor.
A. Practically all the companies doing business here.
Q. How is that?
A. Practically all the companies doing business here.
See id. at 775, 18 S.W.2d at 46.
"Note that only the percentage of income earned by the expert witness from testifying for a
particular party or type of party need be disclosed for effective cross-examination. In most cases,
ascertainment of a percentage figure is unlikely to be unduly burdensome. Moreover, it is within
the court's discretion in protecting the witness from harassment and unnecessary embarrassment,
to prohibit inquiry directed at absolute amounts earned from the litigation process and more im-
portantly inquiry requesting total income of the expert. See, e.g., FED. R. Evio. 611(a)(3). See
generally DaSilva v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 364, 365 (E.D. Pa. 1968) ("Some
approximation of the total billings of one medical expert over a reasonable period might be pro-
per.") (dictum)
"1It is anticipated that counsel will be free to and will in fact explore such matters at the
deposition of the expert witness. See also note 24 supra.
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safeguards exist to prevent any abuse which might arise from the availability
of such cross-examination. Where the frequency with which an expert testifies
for one particular category of party is asserted to be simply the natural conse-
quence of his profession, e.g., a treating doctor in a small city who is often
called by personal injury plaintiffs, and not necessarily an indication of any
bias, such fact could be established on redirect examination of the witness."'
Alternatively, prior to trial a motion in limine for an order barring a par-
ticular line of cross-examination could be presented to the court. The
availability of each line of inquiry establishing financial interest will in each
case ultimately be within the discretion of the trial judge who can refuse to
permit such inquiry whenever its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of undue prejudice or confusion of the issue. 79 It is ques-
tionable whether a court in the exerise of its discretion should permit inquiry
directed solely at the total number of court appearances of the expert witness.
Unless such court appearances are also shown to be (1) on behalf of the same
party or (2) on a comparative basis, most frequently in favor of a particular
category of parties or (3) preliminary to a showing of percentage of income
earned from expert testimony for a party or category of parties in relation to
total expert income,80 it probably does not sufficiently establish bias to be
78State v. Angie, 431 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968).
79See, e.g, FED. R. EvID. 403, note 30 supra. See also United States v. 472.93 Acres of
Land, 455 F.2d 1242 (3rd Cir. 1972); note 68 supra.
For a discussion that completely "misses the boat" see McNenar v. New York, Chi. & St. L.
R.R., 20 F.R.D. 598 (W.D. Pa. 1957). The court in virtually barrin all significant respects both
discovery and cross-examination of a medical witness related to the expert's financial interest ap-
parently feels what the cross-examiner needs to effectively deal with an expert witness is "love,
sweet love."
An impelling factor, to which the court as a practical necessity must give some
weight, is the added contingency of a working relationship between the medical and
legal professions. Expert medical witnesses who presently are engaged in wide and
varied practices, whose time is highly limited and burdened with the treatment and
care of waiting patients, should not be unduly abused and harrassed by counsel for
either side. In the field of negligence and Federal Employers' Liability Act litigation,
both plaintiffs and defendants depend largely upon expert medical testimony. This
dependence requires an attitude of mutual respect on the part of both lawyer and doc-
tor.
To subject members of the medical profession to interrogatories requiring long
and arduous perusal of records dating back to previous years, on matters of collateral
nature, and in no way relating to diagnosis and treatment of the patient in question,
in my judgment, will create an antipathy between the professions which may material-
ly jeopardize the administration of justice.
Parenthetically, in this connection, I have always felt that in order to establish a
working and cohesive relationship between the bar and the medical profession, the
establishment of Codes of Ethics for the two professons in litigation matters should be
effectuated by the adoption of an interprofessional code of conduct and practice.
Id. at 601.
SSee also note 77 infra. Note that establishment of the percentage of the expert's overall
income derived from testifying without reference to its source does tend to impeach the witness's
competency, i.e., the expert does not actually work in his field; he is a true professional expert
witness. Counsel must, however, be extremely cautious in employing financial interest impeach-
ment not clearly indicating a bias in favor of one side. For example, if cross-examining counsel
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permitted when weighed against the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion
of the issue.
Although the unreliability of expert testimony is a matter of common
knowledge among courts and litigators, the non-litigating public, of which
juries are composed, is often ignorant of this fact. Cross-examination is the
principle safeguard a party has against an unscrupulous expert called by his
opponent. Wide latitude must be given examining counsel if cross-
examination is to be effective. The decision as to whether to explore this
avenue of impeachment, bias based upon financial interest, should be left to
trail counsel. What is being advocated is not the blanket employment of such
techniques, only their availability. In some cases, such impeachment will be
effective; in others it will probably backfire. 81 For example, if the expert
makes 60% of his living testifying for a certain category of defendants, cross-
examination disclosing this fact will assist the jury in properly evaluating the
expert's testimony. Members of the jury would most certainly like to be aware
of such a fact.
Hopefully, assurance of the availability of such inquiry will also lead to a
higher quality of expert testimony. If the full force of financial interest bias
impeachment can be brought to bear, parties might begin to seek experts
who could not be effectively subjected to such cross-examination. Experts
might therefore be encouraged to testify for both sides 2 and to perform ac-
tual work in their alleged areas of expertise. If the expert in fact testifies for
both sides, it is natural to assume that chances that he will provide truthful
testimony, or at least testimony which he honestly believes to be truthful, will
be enhanced. 83
One final observation. There is an overall paucity of reported decisions
in this area. If trial lawyers wish to be able to develop these lines of cross-
attempts to impeach solely by showing the number of times the expert has testified, assuming this
line of cross-examination is permitted, it is not too difficult for the expert with the aid of his
counsel to convey to the jury that the reason he is called so often to testify is that he is the "best"
expert available. If the expert can add truthfully on redirect that he appeared in court on behalf
of both plaintiffs and defendants, the attempt at cross-examination may have done little but
bolster the witness.
1See text accompanying note 20 supra.
"See 5 NICHOLS' ON EMINENT DOMAIN. § 18.45 (Supp. 1968). See also McMahon v. Chicago
City Ry. 239 Ill. 334, 88 N.E. 223 (1909). The Court states:
The witness had already answered without objection that he had testified in some fif-
teen cases as an expert in the preceding three months. This question sought to show in
how many of these cases he had testified for street railway companies, and he answered
ten; that in some of the fifteen cases he testified for the plaintiff and not for the defen-
dant. Counsel for appellee was seeking to show by the cross-examination that the doc-
tor always testified for defendant corporations. His answers showed the contrary, and
hence could not have been hurtful to appellant.
Id. at 341, 88 N.E. at 225.
"
5 We say all this to put in its true perspective the role of this particular type of
witness. He is part of the trial apparatus of a personal injury case. As such, every possi-
ble step should be taken to channel his contribution in a direction that will serve the
ends of justice.
Kemeny v. Skorch, 22 Ill. App. 2d 160, 171, 159 N.E.2d 489, 494 (1959).
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examination when they feel it appropriate, they must start forcing courts to
rule upon the propriety of such inquiry. Where trial judges refuse to permit
inquiry, the issue should then be pursued, where possible, on appeal.
Although it is unlikely that a reversal will often be obtained on the grounds
of clear abuse of discretion, the appellate court may take the opportunity to
advise the trial court to permit broad inquiry on cross-examination directed
at establishing the financial interest of the professional expert witness. If trial
counsel fail to raise and pursue this issue, they have nobody but themselves to
blame for the confused and unsatisfactory state of the current law.

